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at which they can choose to play. We will still generalize this definit.ic~n a bit.
A rratclti-choice game is a game in which each player has an arbitra.ry number of artivity levels at which he or she can choose to play. In particular, two players may have different numbers of activity levels. The reward that a group of players can obtain depends on the effort of the cooperating players. This is formalized as follows. Let N:-{ 1, ..., re } be a set of players (n. E RI) and suppose each player í E N has in, f 1 E I~I act,ivity levels at which he can play. We set 16I, :-{0, 1, . .., m; } as the action spacc~of player i E N, where the~act.ion 0 means not participating. A fimcti~n v:~jEN 11I, --~8~with v(0) -0 gives for each coalition s -(sr, ..., s" ) E~iEN~~~t he worth that the players can obtain when each player i plays at level s; E M;.
We denote a multi-choice game by a triple (N, m, v) , where N is the set of players, m E(I~I U{0})N is the vector describing the number of activity levels for all players, and v:~~EN lll;~~is the claaracteri.vt.ic furaction.. If therc~can he no rnnfusion wc~will de~notr a gauu~ (N, rri,~c~) by u. We denote the set of a.ll multi-choicc~gaanes with playc~r sc~t .~' b~. .1IC~.
An example of a multi-choice game occurs when we consider a large builcling project with a deadline and a penalty for every day this deadline is exceeded. Obviously, the date of completion depends on the effort of all people involved in the project: the greater their effort the sooner the project will be completed. This situation gives rise to a multichoice game. The worth of a coalition where each player works at a certain acitivity level is defined as minus the penalty that is to be paid given the date of completion of thc. project whc~n every player makes the corresponding effort.
In their paper Chih-Ru Hsiao and Raghavan (1990) introduced extended Shapley v~~lues for multi-choice games where all players have the same number of activity levels.
They did so by using weights on activity levels, each level having the same weight for all players, a.ncl provicle~cl axioma.tic cha.racterizations of the corresponcling Shapley values. In this paper we extend cores and re~lated solution concepts to multi-choice games.
In section 2 we introdirce imputations, cores and dominance cores and we investigate relations between those concepts. We introduce a notion of balancedness and prove a thc~orem in the spirit of the theorem of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) . Further, in section 3 we introduce Weber sets and we explore the relations between cores and Weber set~, especially for convex games. Also, an extension of the Shapley value is definecí.
Based on the notion of dominance, which is introduced in section 2, we introduce stable sets and subsolutions in section 4. Finally, in section 5 we consider a special class of inulti-choice games, namely flow games. It is shown that these games can be related to non-negative multi-choice games with non-empty cores.
Not~ction. Let N:-{ 1, ..., n} be a. set of players and S C N. By es we denote the vcctor in ff8'~`satisfying es -0 if i~S and e S-1 if i E S. -F~ir two sets A and B in thc same vector space we set AfB:-{.x-}-y~;rEAandyEB} aud we denote the convex hull of A by co(A). Finally, we define the empty sum to be zero. rrationril if, fur all i E N and j E ll~l;~{0}, x ;j is at least the increase in worth that pla.yc~r i can obtain when he works alone and changes his activity from level j-1 to level j, i.e.
x;j ) v(je') -v~(j-1)e`~.
Definition. A payoff vector is an imp2ctation of v if it is efficient and level increase rational.~V
e denote the set of imputa.tions of the game v by I(v). It is ea"sily seen that I(v)~~~~i~(m,e') C v(m) .
Now let~be a payoff vector for the game v. If a player i works at his j th level ( j E 11I, ), j then he obtains, according to x, the amount~~;k. It will often be more natural to k-0 J look at these accumulated payoffs. For i E N and j E M; we denote N, j:-~;r;k.
k-0
The iuc~mberti of a coalition .. E j[,E,v~'l, obt.ain .~(s) :-~-~~a;. Using this, wc~come iEN to the following Deflnitiou. Thc~corr. C(ri) of the game v consists of all a E I(v) that satisfy Ji (.v) 1 v(s) fc,r a.ll ., E jIiEN~1:. Now lct s E~iEN A1; and a~, y E I(v). The imputation y dominat.es the imput.ation x via coalition s, denoted by ydornsx, if Y"(s) G v(s) and Y19,~X;,;
for all i E C(s). Here C(s) :-{i E N~s; 1 0} is the carrier of s, the set of players who ptisticipate in .ti. We say that the imputation y dominates the imput,a.tion~if there c~zicts ru~i s E~,EN 1bf; sucli that ydornyT.
Definition. The dominance core DC(v) of the game v consists of all x E I(v) for which there esists no y E I(v) such that y dominates~.
In theorems 1, 2 and 3 we deal with the relations between the core and the dominance core. Proof. Lct. .r E C(v) and snpposc y E I(v) and s E~i EN 111i, s~0, such that ydom,~.
which clearly gives a contradiction. Therefore,~is not dominated. 0
To simplify the proof of theorern 2 we introduce zero-normalized garnes. For an arbitrary-multi-choice game z~the zero-norrnalizatàon of v is the game vo that is obta.ined by subtracting from v the additive game a with a~(je') :-v(je`) for rill é E 1~' and j E RI,~{0}.
Let v be a zero-normalized game and x a payoff vector for v. Then the condition of 
We leave the proof of this proposition as an exercise to the reader. For i E N azid j E{1, ..., s; } we have that y, j~x,j. Hence, Y',9; ) N,y, for all i E N.
This ancl the fact that 
O-13i4~J IL(1~J 'l0~JJ
Note that. for this game an imputation can only dominate a.nother imputation via the coalition (1.1) and, since al,i -}-az,l C 3~4 for a11 a E I(v), this gives us
inally, for none of the elements r of the dominance core xI,I f~2,1~v((1,1)). Since
C(cj C DC'(~z~) this gives us C(v) -~. Note that for the zero-normalization vo of v it
holds that t~~((1, 1)) -1) 3~4 -vo((2, 1)).
For the ga.me in example 1 both the core and the domina,nce core are convex sets. This is generall~~t.rue, as is stati,d in Theorem 4. Let v be a multi-choice game. Then the following two assertions hold:
Proof. We ornit the proof of part (i), because this is a simple exercise. We now prove part 
w(m) -v(m). (2)
Since DC( t~)~~, we know that I(v)~~. Since v is zero-normalized, this implies z~(~n )~0( cf. (1) ) and
USiiig ( 2) and ( 3) we see that (3) and therefore .Ï (s) G i~,(~) and a dom,gy in w.
I(tu) -I(v).

N~nv lc,t .ti E~~EN M; and let r,y E I(v) -I(w). Since xn(s)
We conclude tha.t y`~'-~~;~ifiENand j-1.
DC(w) -Dc(v).
This irnplies that DC(w)~0-Since u~is zero-norma.lized ( cf. (3)) and
w(s) -min{v(s), v(m)} C v(m) -w(~n), th~~~irem 2 shows that C(ic~) -DC(w).(4)
Then, obviously, y E C(v).
Further, we can identify y with the vector (yl,l, ..., y~,i ).
Thi, lirovc~ti t.hat C( r~)~~if and only if there exist zi ,..., z,~E éB~such that
Oln~iously, there exist zi ,..., z" E~é~satisf5~ing ( 6) and ( 7) if and only-if
From the cluality theorem of linear programming theory we know that (8) Having in mind the map~:~iEn, lll; -~6~with~(m) -1 and~(s) -0 for all s~m, we see that (9) is equivalent to z~being ba,lanced. O
THE wEBER SET
We (,c r (1988) considerc~cl for Pa.ch coopera.tive game (N, v) thP ccnrvex hull of all n! marginal vectors corresponding to v and he showed that the core of a game is always a subset of this so-called Weber set. Shapley (1971) showed that for convex games the cc~re coincides with the Weber set and Ichái9hi (1983) proved the converse, i.e. a game for which the core coincides with the Weber set is convex.
In this section we will extend the definition of the Weber set to rnulti-choice games and investigate the relations between the core and the Weber set of a multi-choice game. Prnof. We will actually pmve that for each multi-choice game v and each x E G' (v) th~re is a~-~~ctor y E LV(c~) such that y is weakly smaller than x, where
C( u) :-{.r : M~6iq~.V(tn) -v(m.), X(s) ? v(s) for all s E~M;
Eh'
and :r;~-0 for all i E N} is a core-catcher (i.e. C(v) C C(v)). We will do so by induction to the number of levels involved in the game v. We distinguish two basic steps.
Let (N, rza, v) be a. ntulti-choice game where~N~-1 and mt E I~I is arbitrary. Then th~~rc~i, ouly onc marginrtl vc~ctor y, wliich satisfies
yt~-z'(.7e1) -'z'((J -1)et) for all j E{ 1, ..., mr }. Suppose x E C(v). Then
X(m.tet) -v(mtet) -Y(mtet) and
Hence,~is weakly smaller than .r..
Let (N, rrz, v) be a multi-choice garrte where~N~-2 and zra -( 1, 1). Then there are two marginal vectors, v(ei) 2~v(et f e~) -v(e~)
yv(e~-F e~) -v(et ) and y v(e2) .
Suliliotie x E C(ri). Then .rt,c 1 v(e' ), xz,t ? v(c~~) a.nd x~,t -~xa,i -v(e'~e~).
Hence, a~is a convea combination of y' and y~. We conclude that x E W(v).~~o w let (.N,m,v) be a multi-choice game such that~{i E N~m; ) 0}~) 2 and~E
h, rn; 1 2. Suppose we already proved the statement for all multi-choice games (1~~, m, i~) with~~E-y m; C~~E~, m;. Since, obviously, C(v) and W(v) are both convex sets, it suffices to prove that for all extreme points x of C(v) we can find a y E W(v) snrh tliat r~iti weaklv smallc~r tlian .r. So, let a~he an eztreme point of C(~~~). Then let. 
t E~,E.y M; be such that 1 c~~EN t; C~;EN m; -1 and X(t) -v(t). We split up (~~",~nz, v) into two games, (N, t, ie) and (N, m-t, u~),
Nc~w .r" E C'(tc), bccautic 1"(t) -,~(t) -r~(t) -7c(t) aiid .1"(s) -.~(s)~v(.,) -ic(.5)
for a.ll Y E~;E,v M; wit.h s c t. Furt.her, r"' E C(iu), because m; -t;
.
~v'(m -t) -~~x i,jfc~-X( m) -~(t) -v(m) -v(t) -w(m -t)
iEN j-1 a.nd
:EN j-1 ,~~~(s) -~.jtc; --I (s -~t) -X(t) 1 v(s -~t) -v(t) -w(s)
for all s E~;E~, M; with s C m-t.
Hc:ncc, using the induction hypothesis, we can find yu E LV(u) such that yu is weakly sinallcr than~~u and yw E Lf'(u~) such that yv' is weakly smaller than xu'. 
Then r~:-( fu,yw) is weakly smaller than x-(~u,.xw). Hence, the only thing to provcỹ et is that y E IV(v).~c e prove that (W(u),W(u,)) :-{(zi,x~)~z~E liV(u), w~E W(u~)} is a subset of
iT-(c~). Notc~that (T6"(u}, [~'(u~) ) acid ti~'(v) are convex sets. Hence, it sufiices to prove that the extreme points of (W(u),W(w)) are elements of W(v). Suppose (zt,z~) is an extreme point of (il'(~u), 6F(w) ). Then, obviously, zt is a marginal vector of u and z~is a marginal vector of w. Let a be an admissible permutation for u a.nd p an admissible permutation for w such that zt is the marginal vector of u corresponding to a and z2 is tlte rnarginal vector of tu corresponding to p. Then (zt,z~) is the marginal vector of i~corresponding to the adtnissible perntutation T for v defined by   (a((i,j)) if i E N and j E{1,..
.,t;} r((~,J)) :-Sl p((i,j-t;))-}-~.E~,t;
ifiENandjE{t;fl,...,m;}.
Hc~nce, ( zt , i~) E G~(v ) and this completes the proof.F or the class of convex multi-choice games we can sa.y more about tlte relation between the core and the~'eber set.
Defiiiition. A multi-choice game v is called conve~if
for all s, t E~;E," ?f7;. Here
(S n t)i :-min{Si,t;} arld (s~J t); :-maX{s;, t;}
for all i E N.
For a convc~x game v it holds that
for all s, s, t E~~E~,16I; satisfying s G s, s; -st for all i E C(t) and s~t E~;EN 117;. This is seen by putting s a~nd s-}-t in the roles of s and t in expression (10). In fact, cv~~ry~;:nn~~tiat.itifyinfi c~xpres5i~n (11 ) is mtn-ex, bnt wc~do not nc~c~d this fact. Proof. Let. a be an admissible~bijection for w. Note that it suf~ices to prove wo E C(v).
Efliciency of wo follows immediately from its definition. Tha.t wo is level increase rational follows straightfor~-ardly when we use expression (11). Now let s E~;E~, M;.
The bijection Q induces an admissible bijection Q' :{(i, j)~i E N, j E{1, ... , s;}} --{ 1, .. ,~;E,v s; } in a.n obvious way. Since~p(o', (i, j) ) C p (v, (i, j) 
r~co{iv~,w2iiu~} -YV(v).
The core element a in example 3 seems to be too large: note that w3 is weakly smaller than :r and w3 is still in the core C(v). This inspires to the following ow we can formulate Theorem 9. Let i~be a convex multi-choice game. Then the~Veber set GV(v) is the convex liull of the set Cm;n ( i~) of minimal core elements. where t11e inequality follows from the fact that f, -j and the last equality follows from the definitions of t andcvo. Now (12) implies that y~C (v) . Hence, we see that mo E Cm;,,(c~). This immediately implies that
Now~let .r be a minimal core element. We prove that~E W(v). According to theorem i we can find a payoff vector y E W(L) that is weakly smaller than~. IIsing (13) we see th.~t y E c~r~ (C,,,;,,(v) ) C C(z~). Since :r is rninimal we may conclude that .c -y E 4ir(v).
otc that theorem 9 implies that for a convex cooperativc game ( N, z~) the core C(n) cctiials thc Weber set i~I'(v). Instcad of conccntra.ting on thc rnnvex lntll of the iuart;iu.~l v~~rtcirs c~f a nudti c~liciicc~ga.in~~, wc~c~an also cunsidc,r thc~av~,ragc, cif t,hc~ma.rginal vr~-tors of a game. For cooperative garnes this will give us the Shaplcy value. ~~c H.~za.n and Ra, gleavaz~, (19cJ0) . For this example we refer to a future paper.
Ch
STABLE SETS AND SUBSOLUTIONS
In section 2 we introduced the notion of domiuance between imputations. The dominance core was definecí using this notion: DC(v) is the set of undominated imputations. In this section we introduce some other sets of payoff vectors for multi-choice games which are based on the notion of domination, stable sets and subsolutions. 
DG(v) -U(I(v)).
A 
The extension of the following theorem from cooperative games towards multi-choice
gamPS is straightforward and therefore we will omit the proof.
Theorem 10. Let r be a multi-choice game. Then the following two assertions hold:
(i) Every stable set contains the dominance core as a subset.
(ii) If the dominance core is a stable set, then there are no other stable sets.
Lacas ( 
{~E I(z~)~,r is protected by A} -U~(A).
Definition (cf. Roth (1976) Theoretn 11. Let v be a multi-choice game. Then the following assertions hold:
(i) Each stable set is a subsolution.
(ii) A siibti~~lution~~aiiuot cunt.ain a. stablc~s~~t as a proper siibset. (iii) Erery sub,olution contains the dominance core as a subset.
(i~-) Every inulti-choice game has at least one subsolution. 
Figure 1
The games~me, ,..., u~e, are dictatorial. We calculate v((0, 1)) -0, z~((1, 0)) -1, and Nrnv (14), (15) and (16) imply that y E C. (v). Hence, v is balanced.W c cau lirc~~~c~tltc c-otlvc,t:tic~cif t.hc~oreni 12 using Theorem 13. Each non-negative zero-normalized balanced rnulti-choice game is a non-neg~cti~.c~linca.r mmbination of zero-normalized balanced simple garnes.
Pruof. Let~~be a non-negat,ive zero-normalized balanced gaine. We providc an algorit,hm to write v as a non-negative linear combination of zero-normalized balanced simple games.
SuPpose v~0 and let x E C(v).
Let k E N be the smallest integer in {i E.~~there exists a j E i17;~{0} such that x;~) 0}
and let Q be the smallest integer in {j E Mk~{0}~xk~1 0}. Further, If i~~0 wc~ca.n follow t.he sante procedure wit,h v in the role of~r~a.nd :r, in the rolc~of .r. It is c~a,tiily seeii that if wr keep on rcpcating t,his proceditre, t,hen a.fter only fiiiitcly maaiy steps we will obtain the zero game. Suppose this happens after q steps. Then we have formd~31i ..., a4 7 0 and zero-normalized balanced simple games wl ,..., wq such that 9 il -~~jr20r.
r-1
The algorithm we described in the proof of theorem 13 is a generalization of an algorithm by Derk9 (198~) for traditional cooperative games.
Theorem 14. Let v be a non-negative zero-normalized balanced game. Then v is a flow ;,uu~~~'orrc".poudin~t,o si. flow sitiia.tion in which a.ll control gaancs arc, zero-nornisilizc~d .~n~l l~,~l.~u~~~~d.
Pruuf. Accordiiig to thc~orcm 13 we c-aii find l~E RI,~3i, ...,~i,~~0 and zc~ro-norm~i.lized balanced simple games w~,..., io,~such that 
